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1.

INTRODUCTION

Any disease or infection which is naturally transmissible from
vertebrate animals to man is classified as a zoonosis. 1 A large
number of communicable diseases are either directly transmitted
from animals to humans or exist in closely antecedent veterinary
strains.2 About 75% of the new and re-emerging infectious
diseases that have affected humans over the past 20 years have
been caused by pathogens originating from an animal or from
products of animal origin. 3
And yet these diseases were assumed to be nearly defeated
when William H. Stewart, U.S. surgeon general in 1969, told
Congress that the era in which infectious diseases represented a
serious threat was coming to an end. 4 Due to factors this paper
will examine in greater detail below, more than three decades after
this declaration, the World Health Organization ("WHO")
estimates that a new individual is infected with the tuberculosis

* J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. Political
Science, East Asian Area Studies, University of Southern California. Thanks to
my parents for making everything possible.
1 See C. Brown, Emerging Zoonoses and Pathogens of Public Health Significance an Overview, 23 ScI. & TECHNICAL REV. 435, 435 (2004), available at https://
www.oie.int/eng/publicat/rt/2302/PDF/435-442brown.pdf.
2 See C. Bolin et. al, World Health Organization, Emerging Zoonotic Diseases
and Water, in WATERBORNE ZOONOSES: IDENTIFICATION, CAUSES AND CONTROL 19, 20
U.A. Contruvo et. al. eds., 2004), available at http://www.who.int/water
_sanitationhealth/diseases/zoonosessect2.pdf (discussing the key factors to the
complex emergence process of an infectious disease).
3 See Brown, supra note 1, at 435 (suggesting that a recent stream of new
diseases has elevated the importance of understanding emerging zoonotic
diseases).
4 David P. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases
and InternationalLaw, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771, 773 (1997).
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bacilli approximately every second.5 Overall, around one-third of
the world population is infected with the tuberculosis bacilli. 6 In
the 1990s, a cholera epidemic swept through Latin America several
7
decades after experts assumed the disease had been eradicated.
Africa, in particular, has seen an alarming increase in the scale and
frequency of infectious disease outbreaks. Cholera and meningitis
cases outbreaks are distressingly common,8 and in the past decade,
there have been of epidemic yellow fever in Burkina Faso, 9 Rift
Valley fever virus in the Sudan,10 and Lassa fever in Sierra Leone. 1
The 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
("SARS") 12 finally shattered the complacency of three decades and
boosted the topic of infectious zoonoses to new prominence on the
world agenda. States joined together to design a more effective
surveillance and response system. One result of these efforts is the
2005 International Health Regulations ("IHR").13
This Comment will examine the new powers and tasks that the
2005 IHR confers upon the WHO and how these new powers fit
into the increasingly complex administrative architecture of global
and regional public health governance, particularly with regard to
developing a unified approach to preventing and coping with the

5 WORLD
HEALTH
ORGANIZATION,
TUBERCULOSIS
(2007), available at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fsl04/en.
6 Id.
7 Robert V. Tauxe et. al, Epidemic Cholera in the New World: Translating Field
Epidemiology into New Prevention Strategies, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Oct.Dec. 1995, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vollno4/tauxe.htm.
8 See World Health Organization, WHO WATER DISEASES FACTSHEET, available
at
http://www.who.int/water-sanitation-health/diseases/cholera/en/
(reporting 140,000 cases in the year 2000); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO
MENINGOCOCCAL MENINGITIS FACTSHEET, available at http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs141/en/ (reporting infection rates of up to 800 cases
per 100,000 population in some regions of Africa).
9 World Health Organization, Yellow Fever in Burkina Faso (Dec. 22, 1998),
http://www.who.int/csr/don/1998-12 -22a/en/index.html.
10 World Health Organization, Rift Valley Fever in Sudan - Update 4 (Dec.
21, 2007), http://www.who.int/csr/don/2007_12_21/en/index.html.
11 World Health Organization, Lassa Fever in Sierra Leone (Apr. 20, 2004),
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004-04_20a/en/.
12 World Health Organization, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
- Multi-Country
Outbreak-Update
(Mar.
16,
2003),
available
at
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_03-16/en/index.html.
13 World Health Assembly[WHA], Revision of the International Health
Regulations, WHA Res. 58.3, art. 65 (May 23, 2005), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf-files/WHA58/WHA58_3-en.pdf.
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emergence and reemergence of zoonoses. The emerging potential
of regional trade organizations to overcome some of the legitimacy
issues implicated in any implementation of a truly global public
health regime will also be considered. Section 2 reviews some of
the most prominent emerging or re-emerging infectious zoonoses
of recent years and discusses why the threat they represent has
been magnified by global environmental and technological trends.
Section 3 examines the theoretical framework for the spectrum of
global administrative organizations, and seeks to place the WHO
and its infectious disease efforts in the proper contextual light.
Section 4 considers the institutional history of the WHO as well as
the possible impact of the 2005 IHR from that global administrative
law perspective. Section 5 examines priorities enshrined in the
founding documents of several regional trade organizations and
how these may open a way for greater regional public health
governance. As it stands now, there is the risk that the powers and
responsibilities outlined in the 2005 IHR represent merely another
iteration, albeit a noticeably enhanced iteration, of the same
response mechanisms of surveillance and quarantine used, with
varying degrees of efficacy, for centuries.
A deeper, truly
interdisciplinary and integrated, global surveillance mechanism
that places equal emphasis on supporting veterinary public health
standards and environmental standards with appropriate
incentives for participation is still needed.
2.

SURVEY OF EMERGING ZOONOSES

It would be far beyond the scope of this paper to examine the
astonishing breadth of diseases meeting the definition of
zoonoses. 14 Humans are exposed to zoonoses through two
different epidemiological patterns. 15 The first involves direct
human contact with the source of the zoonotic agent or,
alternatively, human contact with an animal vector such as bloodfeeding arthropods. 16 Generally, if the zoonotic agent is not
constantly reintroduced the infection will die out in the human
population; however, with more frequent human contact or wide
dissemination of the animal vector the zoonotic agent can appear

14 See Brown, supra note 1, at 436-37 (providing numerous examples of recent
emerging zoonoses and their harmful impact on society).
15 Bolin et al., supra note 2, at 20-21.
16 Id.
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in more places and even be maintained and transmitted among
humans only. 17 The second pattern involves indirect contact
through foods, water, environmental contamination, or other
methods that do not rely on direct contact between human and
animal hosts.18 Accordingly, not all zoonoses present the same
degree of threat or potential impact. There are diseases that follow
the pattern of graduating from animal-to-human transmission to
human-to-human transmission in known circumstances.' 9 They
emerge in a setting of high human population density and result
from close contact to otherwise wild animals. 20 The virus has the
capacity for human-to-human spread. 21 It demonstrates the
potential for the global spread of disease via rapid international
travel. 22 Finally, transmission among healthcare workers is often
intensified by modern health care techniques and the associated
invasive nature of intensive care. 23 It occurs classically for the
influenza virus, which "causes pandemics in humans after periodic
exchanges of genes between the viruses of wild and domestic
birds, pigs, and humans." 24 "Nucleic acid sequence analyses have
demonstrated direct transmission of avian influenza to humans
and have identified potential primate reservoirs from which HIV
types 1 and 2 originated." 25 Other diseases, though familiar, resist
efforts to identify a pattern of circumstance, cause, and effect. In
this category belongs the search for the still-elusive natural
reservoir hosts for Ebola and Marburg viruses. 26 Clearly, there is
both a problem and a problem accurately detecting and
responding to that problem.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 21.
19 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Pandemic Influenza: Public Health Preparednessfor
the Next Global Health Emergency, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 565, 566 (2004) (analyzing
awareness of the essential prerequisites for an influenza pandemic and public
health responses to such warning signs).
20 Id.
21
22

Id.
Id.

Id.
Peter Dazsak et al., Emerging Infectious Diseases of Wildlife: Threats to
Biodiversity and Human Health, 287 SCIENCE 443, 446 (2000).
25 Id.
23
24

26

Id.
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2.1. Tuberculosis
"Tuberculosis may be viewed as an emerging infection over a
long timeline.... Evidence of tuberculosis.., exists in ancient
Egypt and South America." 27 It is believed that cows were the
original disease vector, though tuberculosis is one zoonosis that
has long since maintained a presence in the human population and
been transmitted as such.28 Tuberculosis may be transmitted
whenever infectious individuals talk, cough, sneeze, or spit.29
"Infectious" has a specific meaning in this situation, however: only
those whose tuberculosis infection has reached their lungs are
infectious. 30
If untreated, persons with an active tuberculosis
infection will infect, on average, between ten and fifteen people
every year. 31 But individuals infected with tuberculosis bacilli do
not necessarily become sick with the disease. 32 The immune
system isolates the tuberculosis bacilli which, protected by a thick
coat, can lie dormant for years. 33 When an individual's "immune
34
system is weakened, the chances of becoming sick are greater."
Should an individual with an active tuberculosis infection fail to
obtain proper treatment, "extensively drug-resistant" tuberculosis
may develop, a far more difficult illness to treat.35
Astonishingly, someone in the world is newly infected with
tuberculosis approximately every second. 36 Overall, about onethird of the world's population is infected. 37 The WHO estimates
that the largest number of new tuberculosis (TB) cases in 2005
occurred in the South-East Asia Region, which accounted for

27 Alfred DeMaria, Jr., The Globalization of Infectious Diseases: Questions Posed
by the Behavioral, Social, Economic and Environmental Context of Emerging Infections,
11 NEw ENG. J.INT'L & CoMP. L. 37,41 (2004).
28 See id. (explaining that the first known cases of tuberculosis may have been
bovine tuberculosis rather than "true human tuberculosis").
29 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 5 ("When infectious people
cough, sneeze, talk or spit, they propel TB germs, known as bacilli, into the air.").
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See id. ("Drug-resistant TB is caused by inconsistent or partial
treatment .....
36 Id.
37 Id.
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thirty-four percent of incident cases globally. 38 It is estimated that
1.6 million deaths resulted from TB in 2005. 39 Both the highest
number of deaths and the highest mortality per capita are in
40
Africa.
2.2. Lyme Disease
An excellent example of the interaction of human activity
and behavior with infection risk is presented by the
emergence and spread of Lyme disease across the
Northeast United States. There is evidence of Lyme disease
in the Northeast from the 1940s and earlier, and certainly in
Europe
for
at
least
one-hundred
years....
The spread of Lyme disease is directly related to
ecological changes, as well as to the reintroduction of deer
and their explosive population growth, in the Northeast.
For most of the nineteenth century, the Northeast was
cleared agricultural land, with the virgin forest virtually
eliminated. The only deer that survived were located on
islands off the coast. In the closing years of the nineteenth
century, as agriculture moved west and scrub forest started
to reclaim the land, the cleared land gave way to
reforestation and suburban yards....
Deer were
reintroduced and protected, and therefore rebounded to
41
unprecedented populations.
Early infection with Lyme disease usually presents as a mild
flu-like illness with a rash wherever the tick embedded itself.42 If
left untreated however, up to seventy percent of patients suffer
bacterial invasion of organs and systems including the brain, heart,

Id.
Id.
40 Id.
41 DeMaria, supra note 27, at 43-44 (footnotes omitted); see also David H.
Persing et al., Detection of Borrelia burgdorferi DNA in Museum Specimens of Ixodes
dammini Ticks, 249 SCIENCE 1420, 1420 (1990) (recalling the recording of Lyme
disease in Europe in the early twentieth century and the discovery of Lyme
disease in museum ticks which were found in the Northeast United States in the
1940s).
42 Alan G. Barbour & Durland Fish, The Biological and Social Phenomenon of
Lyme Disease, 260 SCIENCE 1610, 1610 (1993).
38
39
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eyes, nerves, or joints. 43 The consequences can be disabling
most common arthropodthough usually not fatal. 44 It is the
45
States.
United
the
in
vectored disease
Deer are hosts to the adult Ixodes ticks which transmit the
Lyme disease-causing organism.... Larvae, nymphs, and
the adult ticks feed and breed on deer, and then may
transmit infection to humans.
...Given the increased human suburban and exurban
population, the situation is ideal for humans to be bitten...
and acquire Lyme disease. Had social and environmental
conditions remained unchanged, Lyme disease would be
46
perhaps no more than an occasional clinical oddity.
2.3. Healthcare-associatedInfections and Ebola
DeMaria observes, "[h]ospital-associated infections were often
thought of as an institutional problem, but have developed a
47
broader, international dimension."
A potentially more dramatic threat is raised by the Ebola
virus, which causes a usually fatal, overwhelming, and
communicable disease in West Africa. Ebola virus infection
has no effective treatment. Many secondary cases of Ebola
occur in care-givers exposed to blood and body fluids of
patients in homes and health care facilities with primitive
levels of infection control and limited resources. It is
possible that a health care provider from the developed
world working in such a facility could have unrecognized

43 Id.
44

Id.

See id. (explaining that 9,465 cases of Lyme disease were formally reported
in the United States in 1991).
46 DeMaria, supra note 27, at 44-45 (footnote omitted); see also Barbour & Fish,
supra note 42, at 1611 (describing how larvae and nymphs "feed on all terrestrial
mammal species").
47 DeMaria, supra note 27, at 47; cf.Paolo Francesconi et al., Ebola Hemorrhagic
Fever Transmission and Risk Factors of Contacts, Uganda in 9 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1430, 1430 (2003) (examining various outbreaks of Ebola hemorrhagic
fever in Africa).
45
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contact with Ebola and return to their home country before
48
the onset of symptoms.
The incubation period for Ebola can range from a few days to
three weeks. 49 "Delay in proper diagnosis could lead to more
health care workers being exposed and a subsequent healthcarerelated outbreak of Ebola, which then could potentially spread to
community contacts of the infected health care workers."5 0
The WHO recommends that:
All hospital personnel should be briefed on the nature of
the disease and its routes of transmission. Particular
emphasis should be placed on ensuring that invasive
procedures such as the placing of intravenous lines and the
handling of blood, secretions, catheters and suction devices
are carried out under strict barrier nursing conditions.
Hospital staff should have individual gowns, gloves, masks
and goggles. Non-disposable protective equipment must
not be reused unless they have been properly disinfected.
Infection may also be spread through contact with the
soiled clothing or bed linens from a patient with Ebola.
Disinfection is therefore required before handling these
items.5 1
According to the WHO, Ebola haemorrhagic fever ("EHF") is a
haemorrhagic illness which causes death in 50-90% of all clinically
ill cases .... 52 The natural reservoir of the Ebola virus seems to
reside in the rain forests of the African continent and in areas of the
Western Pacific. 53 The Ebola virus is transmitted by direct contact
with the blood, secretions, organs or other bodily fluids of infected
persons5 4

48 DeMaria, supra note 27, at 47 (footnote omitted).
49 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, EBOLA HEMORRHAGIc FEVER INFORMATION PACKET 3

(2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/spb/mnpages/dispages/
FactSheets/EbolaFact_Booklet.pdf
50 DeMaria. supra note 27, at 47-48.
51 See World Health Organization, Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever, available at
http:/ /www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fslO3/en/index.html.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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"Several human and animal Ebola outbreaks have occurred"
from 2000 to 2004 in Gabon and the Republic of Congo. 55 One
study found that "[t]he human outbreaks consisted of multiple
simultaneous epidemics caused by different viral strains, and each
epidemic resulted from the handling of a distinct gorilla,
chimpanzee, or duiker carcass. 56 These animal populations
declined markedly during human Ebola outbreaks, apparently as a
result of Ebola infection."5 7 A "high number of animal carcasses in
forested areas just before and during the 2001 human Ebola
outbreaks" were noted by researchers in Gabon.58 Their research
concluded that "Ebola outbreaks occur abruptly, exterminating
exposed animal populations very rapidly and very locally (groups
living in other parts of the sanctuary were barely affected)."59 The
carcasses found may have represented only a fraction of possibly
thousands dead. 60 The study concluded that the slow reproductive
cycle of the great apes following such high mortality levels,
together with hunting and poaching, could lead to their extinction
61
in western central Africa.
3.

GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CONTEXT

The perceived authority of global institutions to bind national
governments can be grossly simplified into the familiar question of
whether the means fit the ends. Put another way, perceived
authority - and thus the effectiveness of that authority - may be
determined by considering who is exercising that authority and
whether such exercise is intended to be formally binding.
Commentators in the emerging field of global administrative law
often categorize global institutions either by formal organizational
62
structure or the qualitative aspects of institutional competence.
55 Eric M. Leroy et al., Multiple Ebola Virus Transmission Events and Rapid
Decline of CentralAfrican Wildlife, 303 SCIENCE 387, 387(2004).
56 Id.

57

Id.

58 Id.at 388.
60

Id. at 389.
Id.

61

Id.

59

Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68
15, 20 (2005) (noting the emergence of global
administrative law, categorizing some actors, and proposing arguments for and
against unification of this type of law); See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governanceat
the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1510-11
62
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The latter will be relied on more intensively here as the 2005 IHR
present an exercise within the institutional competence of the
WHO and not one which impacts its formal organizational
64
63
structure. Two models, proposed by Daniel Esty and Eric Stein,
provide helpful visual assistance in defining the parameters of the
issue of perceived authority and thus providing a context within
which to evaluate the 2005 IHR as an exercise in authority.
3.1. Modeling Legitimacy
Daniel Esty proposes visualizing the relationship between
institutional competence and effective authority as two intersecting
axes, taking the form of a matrix. 65 The first encompasses the
spectrum of decisionmakers and the second encompasses the range
of consequences of a decision, from formal-mandatory to informalvoluntary. 66 A global institution will face greater or lesser
resistance to the exercise of its authority depending on its place
within this matrix. 67 The lower-right side of this matrix is the
realm of treatymaking, wherein national officials are the primary
have
formal-mandatory
and
decisions
decisionmakers
consequences; in the lower-left side, national officials are still the
primary decisionmakers but the results of decisions are informalvoluntary. 68 Moving into the upper left side, international officials
are the decisionmakers but their decisions are informal-voluntary;
this changes on the upper right where international officials make
69
decisions with formal-mandatory consequences.
Eric Stein models a similar question of legitimacy that centers
on the relationship between the formal-mandatory effect of
decisions made through global institutions and the level of cultural
and political similarity between the affected components of that

(2006) (predicting that demand for global administrative law will emerge at the
intersection of supranational decisionmaking and formal rulemaking).
63 Esty, supra note 62.
64 Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 489, 494-495 (2001) (suggesting that the level of integration of an
international organization or regime is determined by normative-institutional and
empirical-social factors).
65 Esty, supra note 62, at 1509.
66 Id.
67 Id.

68 Id. at 1510.
69

Id.at 1511.
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institution. 70 Stein names his axes the "normative-institutional"
and the "empirical-social." 71 Stein's matrix assigns an integration
value to the global institution under consideration; integration, for
both his purposes and the purposes of this Comment, is defined as
a measure for the degree of transfer of public national powers to
global institutions. 72
Factors that align upon the normative-institutional axis include:
the composition of institutional organs and procedures such as
voting mechanisms, as well as whether the institution is
cooperative and non-rule directed and thus essentially "a forum
for [the] exchange of information." 73 Perhaps most importantly,
"normative-institutional" characteristics are also determined by
considering whether the institution may impose international
obligations or rules, and whether the institution serves any "rule
enforcing" function. 74 The "empirical-social" axis contemplates the
"political, economic, and cultural impact of the measures adopted"
by a global institution.75 It asks whether there exists "a level of
common interest sufficient to overcome cultural differences
between the.., states," or alternatively, whether there is a level of
popular support that will suffice to buttress the transfer of some
traditionally national function to a global institution. States with
comparable political and legal systems are deemed more likely to
accept a higher level of integration. 76
3.2. The Legitimacy Problem: Perspectives and Proposals
Criticism of the authority of global institutions is thus founded
on one of two complaints: either a lack of democratic
accountability or a lack of procedural rigor and transparency. The
two categories necessarily overlap in many areas, but the choice of
foundation usually colors both diagnosis of the problem and
proposed solutions. When, for example, Eleanor Kinney writes
Stein, supra note 64, at 489.
Id.
72 Id. at 493-94 (offering Karl Deutsch's definition of integration, as "a process
of transforming 'previously separate units into components of a coherent
system,"') (citing KARL W. DEUTSCH, THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
198 (2d ed. 1978)).
73 Id. at 494.
74 Id.
70

71

75

Id.

76

Id.
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about the sense of unease that globalization generally can provoke,
she assigns primary responsibility for this unease to two
perceptions. 77
First, she argues that local and national
governments are ceding or losing power to international
regulatory bodies and that these organizations and networks are
78
seen as inaccessible and unaccountable to ordinary people.
Second, the processes by which these organizations make
important decisions and policies are not democratic. 79 Kinney
accordingly concludes that increased accountability, transparency,
and accessibility will necessarily democratize the decisionmaking
processes of global institutions and thus enhance their perceived
legitimate authority. 80 Stein too is primarily concerned with two
trends: the internationalization of decision making in global
institutions and the expansion of democracy.8 ' Stein posits that
these may be in conflict and have thus led to a tension that
underlies all discourse on the democracy-legitimacy 82 deficit in
national and international arenas. 83 In order to bring this tension
into equilibrium, states should encourage the greatest degree of
participation possible by national delegations in dialogue with the
global institution on rulemaking procedures.8 4 Organizations with
a low level of integration8 5 must first focus on transparency,
openness to the outside world, and effective policy results.86
However, organizations with a higher level of integration should
seek to decentralize and disaggregate some power through greater

77 See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Emerging Field of International Administrative
Law: Its Content and Potential, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 415 (2002) (discussing the
development of public international law and calling for policymaking reform in a
democratic fashion).
78 See id. at 427 (explaining that globalization has caused decision making
power to shift from the local level to the international level via the creation of
international regulatory bodies).
79 Id.
80 Id., at 428-31 (discussing the unique characteristics of international law
that make transparency, accountability, and accessibility indispensable attributes
of a democratic international law regime).
81 See Stein, supra note 64, at 489-90.
82 1 use the two concepts as one word here to convey the degree to which the
two concepts are intertwined for certain commentators.
83 See Stein, supra note 64, at 492.
84 Id. at 531-34.
85 Stein includes the WHO in this assessment.
86 See Stein, supra note 64, at 531-34.
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reliance on regional and local authorities. 87 At this level of
integration, it is suggested that the principle of subsidiarity 88
should be honored.
On the other hand, returning to Esty's model, democracy
recedes into the background as a laudable goal, but one not
essential in the task of achieving legitimate and accountable global
administrative governance. Questions of legitimacy and authority
increase in importance as a global organization moves away from
the "safest" realm of the lower left, essentially providing a forum
for national officials to discuss informal-voluntary measures, and
into the upper-right quadrant, where international officials make
decisions with formal-mandatory effect.8 9 These questions derive
from a composite of anxieties, and can be roughly divided into two
categories: anxieties regarding legitimacy and anxieties regarding
accountability. 90 Intermingled with these two categories is the
problem of accessibility. In the case of legitimacy, the foremost
concern is often the erosion, perceived or real, of national
sovereignty. The presence of an additional layer of governance to
which the highest national officials must answer at a minimum
involves an additional layer of bureaucracy which certain
measures and programs must navigate. 91 Additional bureaucracy
inevitably invokes the issue of efficiency: it may be troubling for
citizens of a hegemonic nation such as the United States to turn
over certain policy responsibilities to far-away global institutions
such as the United Nations. 92 Furthermore, procedural
transparency varies widely depending on the global institution in
question and there are no uniform norms of administrative
procedure or transparency. Transparency issues are also related to
the larger question of accountability or the lack thereof. The

Id.
The principle of subsidiarity, as generalized from the amended European
Community Treaty, may be defined as follows: an international institution should
take action only if and insofar as the objective of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the member states, and therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, can be better achieved by the international
institution. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 173.
89 See Esty, supra note 62, at 1515-23.
90 Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in
World Politics,99 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 29 (2005).
91 See Esty, supra note 62, at 1515-23.
87
88

92

Id.
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additional layer of bureaucracy that global institutions can
represent, as described earlier, also means that the international
officials making policy decisions are that much farther removed
from the citizens of a given nation and often unconstrained by any
system of institutional checks and balances. Ensuring that these
officials can and are acting in the best interests of those citizens is
thus a prerequisite of adequate governance in a global institution.
This alternative understanding of the foundational question
behind issues of global institutional legitimacy and authority leads
to different potential solutions as well. The encouragement and
implementation of more democratic representation systems in
global institutions is certainly one potentially helpful mechanism
but it is by no means a panacea. In this model, legitimacy may be
derived a number of ways and refer to different sources of
authority. 93 Results-based legitimacy refers to the governing
institution's proven ability to deliver good outcomes. 94 Orderbased legitimacy is simply governmental authority that is
perceived as legitimate because the system is one built on tradition
and provides some measure of order and authority. 95 Systemic
legitimacy relies on the dispersion of authority among many
institutions with competing interests as a way of ensuring
effectiveness and efficiency as decisions are critiqued over multiple
iterations. 96 This is particularly useful when triangulating difficult
policy choices where there is factual uncertainty or normative
disagreement. Finally, deliberative legitimacy refers to the idea
that dialogue which includes participation by those representing a
wide range of views reinforces perceptions of legitimacy. 97 Esty
models "global administrative law toolbox" to further enhance any
source of authority and legitimacy which features, among others:
systematic and sound
rulemaking
transparency,
public
participation, and a structured, transparent fact-finding process
with open option evaluation. 98 International organizations with
greater legitimacy buttressed by appropriate rulemaking
procedures are likely to be given greater authority. These forces
combine in an iterative process in which institutional design and

94

See Esty, supranote 62, at 1515-23.
Id. at 1517.

95

Id. at 1518.

96

Id. at 1519.
Id. at 1520.
Id. at 1515-23.

93

97

98
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administrative law develop alongside authority and legitimacy.
WHO activities in the past have combined a high degree of
interdependence with relatively limited and technical issues, thus
reducing conflict on sensitive political and cultural point, but
provisions in the 2005 IHR allocate greater decisionmaking
authority than ever before to WHO officials and impose greater
public health requirements upon member states. These additional
responsibilities stem from the assertion made in the WHO
Constitution that health is a human right: a state that is not limited
to the mere absence of disease or infirmity. 99
Global institutions first emerged as organizations to facilitate a
limited degree of necessary dialogue and cooperation between the
great powers of the day. That legacy has sometimes been
recognized and described in a radical form of critique, wherein the
current institutions of global governance are depicted as
"imperial" institutions, "furthering the goals and stabilizing the
dominance of Northern industrialized countries at the expense of
the South, and of the dominant capitalist classes at the expense of
subaltern peoples." 100 The legal commentators discussed above, as
well as, political scientists stress the importance of opportunity for
genuine participation rather than the club-like setting and
privileges of the past.'01 Both Stein and Esty model a potential
progression from the limited, dialogue-oriented global institutions
of the past to significantly more expansive, regulatory bodies with
a high level of integration in the given area of competence. The
2005 IHR developed from a series of international sanitary
conventions dating back to the nineteenth century; these sanitary
conventions included the major trading and colonial powers of the
day and aimed primarily to restrict the overenthusiastic use of
quarantines and trade blockades with respect to a few recognized
infectious diseases. 102 In the intervening century, as will be
discussed in more detail subsequently, the sanitary conventions
became the 1968 IHR, revised and promulgated again in 2005.
With the promulgation of the 2005 IHR, the WHO has abandoned
99 Constitution of the World Health Organization, Principles of Constitution,
July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
100 Kingsbury, supra note 62, at 52.
101Robert 0. Keohane, Governance in a Partially Globalized World: Presidential
Address, American PoliticalScience Association, 2000, 95 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 2 (2001).
102 Lesley A. Jacobs, Rights and Quarantine During the SARS Global Health
Crisis: Differentiated Legal Consciousness in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Toronto, 41
LAW & Soc'y REV. 511, 520 (2007).
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its former strictly limited quarantine system for a handful of
specified infectious diseases. 10 3 A significantly more open-ended
decision instrument now determines the degree of intervention
necessary. 10 4 This new approach redefined the WHO's area of
competence, formerly both technical and quite restricted: the
WHO may now potentially exert some degree of authority upon
controversial political and cultural landscapes.
4.

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

The WHO was established on April 7, 1948 when its
constitution was adopted by the International Health Conference
held in New York in July 1946 and was signed by sixty-one
representatives of states. 105 The organization is a specialized
agency of the United Nations that has a mandate, among others,
"to act as the directing and coordinating authority on international
health work."'106 It is the sole such international authority. The
WHO has over 190 member states and its policies and programs
are governed by the World Health Assembly ("WHA"), which is
composed of representatives of the WHO member states. 107
4.1. History
The Charter of the United Nations gives the WHO a mandate
to promote and protect health within the UN system. 08 The
Constitution of the WHO enumerates significant treaty-making
powers, but to date these powers remain largely unused. 10 9 At the
creation of the WHO in 1948, it was predicted that international
law would play a major role in global health policy." 0 The WHO
103 David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health
Security: The New International Health Regulations, 4 CHINESE J.INT'L L. 325, 361
(2005) (stating that public health considerations, rather than commercial interests,
were used to define the scope and purpose of the new IHR).
104 Id.
105 World Health Organization, History of WHO, http://www.who.int/
about/history (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
106 Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra note 99, art. 2.
107 World Health Organization, Governance of WHO, http://www.who.int/
about/governance (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
108 Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra note 99, Principles
of Constitution; U.N. Charter art. 57.
109 See Fidler, supra note 103 and accompanying text.
110 Objiofor Aginam, Globalization of Infectious Diseases, International Law and
the World Health Organization: Opportunities for Synergy in Global Governance of
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Constitution provides the organization with authority to promote
and adopt conventions, regulations, and recommendations that
address any matter within its competence."' This competence is
broad, considering that the WHO definition of health is "a state of
complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely
the absence of disease or infirmity."112 This gives the organization
an expansive legal basis upon which to develop and promote
international law.
Complementing the authority of the WHO, the WHA has the
authority to adopt regulations on sanitation and quarantine issues,
nomenclatures of diseases, causes of death, public health practices,
and standards for international diagnostic procedures." 3 The
WHA also has the authority to promulgate standards for "the
safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical and
similar products moving in international commerce," and
regulations governing the "advertising and labeling of biological,
pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international
commerce."114 This necessitates close cooperation between the
WHO and other international bodies such as the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), World Organization for Animal Health
("OIE"), and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United
Nations ("FAO"). The WHO Constitution also explicitly imagines
that the institution acts as a key actor with interests in the
protection of the global environment." 5
4.2. Article 19
Article 19 of the WHO Constitution gives the organization
treaty-making powers. It provides:
[T]he Health Assembly shall have the authority to adopt
conventions or agreements with respect to any matter
within the competence of the Organization. A two-thirds
vote of the Health Assembly shall be required for the
Epidemics, 11 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 59, 62-63 (2004) (discussing the
critiques of the organization for marginalizing international law even though
international conventions played a formidable role prior to the WHO).
111 Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra note 99, arts. 21 &
23.
112 Id. at Principles of Constitution.
113 Id. arts. 19 & 21.
114 Id. art. 21.
115 Id. art. 2.
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adoption of such conventions or agreements, which shall
come into force for each Member when accepted by it in
16
accordance with its constitutional processes.
The language of Article 19 provides for a standard treatymaking power in accordance with the competencies of multilateral
organizations generally, but some scholars argue that when
combined with the ambitious objectives of the WHO, objectives not
listed in the founding documents of any of the WHO's
predecessors, "the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible
level of health,"" 7 and the WHO's equally ambitious definition of
health as "a state of complete physical, mental, and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.. ."118
Article 19 provides the WHO with virtually limitless treaty-making
power.1 9 If one subscribes to this interpretation then the treatymaking power certainly surpasses any treaty power possessed by
the WHO's precursors: the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, the
International Office of Public Health, and the Health Organization
of the League of Nations. 120 An ambitious Preamble is certainly
not unknown among the founding documents of international
organizations; it is the combination of this latent ambition and the
unusual default-approval mechanism outlined in Article 21121 that
make of the WHO a potentially regulatory/administrative body.
4.4. Article 21
Article 21 of the WHO Constitution provides for a unique
treaty-making procedure that is unparalleled in the practice or
organization of other multilateral institutions, namely the power of
the World Health Assembly to adopt legally binding regulations
concerning:
(a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and other
procedures designed to prevent the international spread of
disease;
Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 1.
118 Id. at Principles of Constitution.
119 David P. Fidler, Constitutional Outlines of Public Health's "New World
Order" 77 TEMP. L. REV. 247, 260 (2004).
120 See Fidler, supra note 103, at 341 (illustrating how "[t]he WTO intensified
the relationship between public health and international trade law.").
121 Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra note 99, art. 21.
116

117
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(b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases, cause of death
and public health practices;
(c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for
international use;
(d) standards with respect to the safety, purity and potency
of biological, pharmaceutical, and similar products moving
in international commerce; [and]
(e) advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical
122
and similar products moving in international commerce.
Article 21 therefore affords the World Health Assembly the
power to adopt legally binding regulations without obligation to
work within the traditional consent mechanisms of and by states.
This authority is rarely utilized by the WHO but its exercise would
effectively shift the WHO to the formal-mandatory end of the
spectrum in both Esty's and Stein's models of administrative
authority. For regulations adopted under Article 21, there is a
"contracting out" procedure described in Article 22.
Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall come into
force for all Members after due notice has been given of
their adoption by the Health Assembly except for such
Members as may notify the Director-General of rejection or
123
reservations within the period stated in the notice.
Articles 21 and 22 of the WHO Constitution have been
described as creating a "quasi-legislative procedure that
constitute[s] a radical departure from conventional international
124
rulemaking and norm-generation."
4.5. Article 23
Article 23 of the WHO Constitution gives the WHA the
authority to make recommendations with respect to any matter
within the competence of the organization. 25 This soft-law
mechanism has been the WHO's most-utilized tool in recent
decades. 26 Stein noted this preference for voluntary, soft-law
122
123
124
125
126

Id.
Id. art. 22.
Aginam, supra note 110, at 64.
Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra note 99, art. 23.
See Fidler, supra note 4, at 838 (describing WHO's preference for Article
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oriented guidelines and noted that while the WHO, due to the
provisions discussed above, could potentially be a highly
integrated, global institution, it consistently failed to utilize its
mandatory authority. 127 The WHO has, until very recently, moved
in a very low-integration pattern.
4.6. Inter-OrganizationCooperation
The WHO has participated in a number of joint projects with
other UN agencies in the area of international public health and the
environment, though it has not yet promulgated any binding
regulations or resolutions on the level of the IHR that contemplate
the scope of the interdependence of human health and the larger
environment. 128 The WHO has been particularly active in the
realm of veterinary public health ("VPH") and implements
programs directed towards VPH in all of its regional offices. VPH
activities are also closely coordinated with the FAO and OIE; 129
assistance is available upon request to member states but the
permanent partners are all global institutions. WHO also has a
strong scientific evidence base, 130 a joint partnership with the
United Nations Environmental Program ("UNEP") named the
Health and Environmental Linkages Initiative ("HELI") 131 and
infrastructures such as the Global Outbreak Alert and Response
Network ("GOARN"),132 that can promote both environmental and
health protection in developing countries. In spite of this potential,
in the fifty-plus years of its history, international legal scholars
127 See Stein, supra note 64 at 531-34 (noting that disproportionate reliance on
the WHA is an emerging challenge in the WHO).
128 See, e.g., World Health Organization, Environmental Management for
Vector Control, available at http://www.who.int/water-sanitation_health/
resources/envmanagement/en/
(defining Environmental Management for
Vector Control as the "activities for the modification and/or manipulation of
environmental factors or their interaction with man with a view to preventing or
minimising vector propagation and reducing man-vector-pathogen contact").
129 World Health Organization, WHO Zoonoses and Veterinary Public
Health: Collaborating Institutions, available at http://www.who.int/zoonoses/
institutions/en/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
130 See, e.g., World Health Organization, Priority Environment and Health
Risks Database, available at http://www.who.int/heli/risks/en/index.html
(providing systematic data on the environmental burden of disease globally).
131 World
Health Organization, HELI Home Page, available at
http://www.who.int/heli.
132 World Health Organization, GOARN
Home Page,
available at
http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/guidingprinciples/en/ index.html.
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have primarily criticized the organization for marginalizing
international law in most of its post-1948 global health programs
and policies.133 The recent revision of the IHR and the negotiation
of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control ("FCTC") 134 as
well as two other zoonoses-related initiatives discussed infra signal
a fundamental change of direction and approach.
Global Early Warning System for Major Animal Diseases,
1
including Zoonoses ("GLEWS") 35
is a joint system that builds on the added value of
combining and coordinating the alert mechanisms of FAO,
OlE and WHO ... to assist in prediction, prevention and
control of animal disease threats, including zoonoses,
through sharing of information, epidemiological analysis
and contribute to joint field missions to assess and control
136
the outbreak.
This initiative has several goals, among them, to "[plrovide
technical input into coordinated joint responses to animal health
emergencies." 137 Accordingly, "if in consultation between the three
partners there is clear [need] for [onsite] assessment of the
[emerging] situation, GLEWS can provide technical input into an
urgent joint field mission [while also] engaging the country

authorities .

"..."138

Mediterranean Zoonoses Control Programme ("MZCP") is the
only regional zoonoses control program working directly under
the auspices of the WHO. 139 Member countries include: Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Lebanon, Kuwait, Portugal, Saudi Arabia,
133 See David P. Fidler et al., Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases:
Challengesfor International,National, and State Law, 31 INT'L LAW. 773, 777-80 (1997)
(discussing the inadequate international legal regime for addressing infectious
disease control).
134 See World Health Organization, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, May 21, 2003, WHO Doc A56/VR/4, 42 I.L.M. 518 (2003) [hereinafter

FCTC].
135 World Health Organization, Global Early Warning System for Major
Animal Diseases, including Zoonoses (GLEWS), http://www.who.int/zoonoses/
outbreaks/glews/en/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
136

Id.

Id.
Id. (alteration in original)
139 World Health Organization, Mediterranean Zoonoses Control Program
(MZCP) of the World Health Organization, available at http://www.who.int/
zoonoses/institutions/mzcp/en/.
137
138
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Spain, Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey. 140 The MZCP works to
promote programs for zoonoses prevention as to maintain
surveillance and control measures of zoonoses and related
foodborne diseases. 141 The MZCP also implements training
activities and promotes veterinary public health activities and
142
public health education.
5.

FROM SANITATION TO HEALTH: EVOLUTION OF THE
REGULATIONS

International law and public health scholar David Fidler
divides the evolution of international public health law into three
periods. 143 During the first phase (1830-1900), travel and trade
restrictions in the form of quarantine measures represented the
sole disease-prevention strategy pursued on the international
level.'" In accordance with this model, the International Sanitary
Convention ("ISC") dealing with cholera was adopted in Venice in
1892, followed by another convention dealing with plague in
1897.145 International law played an important role during this first
phase in achieving the primary goals of the regime participants:
the harmonization of restrictive national quarantine practices in
order to prevent unfair trade disruption, and the establishment of
surveillance systems in order to allow for the timely erection of
146
quarantine barriers.
Advances in science ushered in the second phase (19001940). 147 The ISC unified and replaced the conventions of the early

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id.

143 See generally Fidler, supra note 103 (providing a detailed history of

international law on infectious disease control).
144 See id. at 329 (arguing that prior to international cooperation on defending
against the spread of infectious diseases, countries imposed trade and quarantine
regulations in response to the threat of spreading disease).
145 Id. at 330.
146 See id. at 329 ("[T]he nature of the problem forced States to engage in
certain kinds of co-operation, which formed the classical regime's architecture.
This architecture's purpose was to protect States against the international spread
of infectious diseases in a way that minimized interference with international
trade and travel.").
147 See id. at 335 (stating that changes in scientific knowledge accounted for
amending the process by which international law on infectious disease was
adopted).
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nineteenth century. 148 The ISC was in turn replaced by the
International Sanitary Regulations ("ISR") in 1951; the ISR was
meant to unify the previous conventions and replace the cyclical
process of creating updated conventions. Only six diseases were
initially subject to the ISR: cholera, plague, yellow fever, smallpox,
typhus and relapsing fever. 149 This early "regime pursued
protection against the international spread of infectious diseases
through international legal obligations requiring that (1) States
notify other countries about outbreaks of specified diseases; and (2)
maintain adequate public health capabilities at points of disease
entry and exit (e.g., sea ports and, later, airports)." 5 0 The early
regime "sought to minimize public health interference with
international trade and travel by requiring that disease-prevention
measures restrictive of international trade and travel be based on
scientific evidence and public health principles. " 15 1 But neither the
new scientific discoveries nor the emerging interest in public
health interventions translated into a broadening of the material
scope of international disease-control law. Rather, quarantine
harmonization and disease surveillance continued to be at the
center of the international health law debate.
Revolutionary medical discoveries such as antibiotics and
vaccines led into the third phase of international disease control
(1940-90).152 In 1969, the ISR was renamed the IHR and typhus
and relapsing fever were taken off the list of diseases covered,
leaving only four. In this period, international law came to play a
diminishing role in the struggle against infectious diseases.
Several factors contributed to this decline. 53 First, modern means
of transportation and general improvements in public health
gradually rendered quarantine, and with it the entire body of
quarantine conventions, anachronistic. Second, scientific advances
drastically increased the popularity of medical intervention as a
148 See David P. Fidler, Microbialpolitik: Infectious Diseases and International
Relations, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1, 24 (1998) (describing the efforts to make
"infectious disease control a common value of international society").
149 Fidler, supra note 103, at 330.
150 Id. at 329.
151 Id.
152 See id. at 335 ("The development of antibiotics and vaccines for many
infectious diseases in the post-World War II period created resources not present
when the classical regime emerged and proliferated.").
153 See id. at 333 (previewing the "reasons behind the classical regime's
marginalization & stagnation").
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disease-prevention
strategy,
overshadowing
traditional
alternatives. 5 4 Consequently, the surveillance of diseases and the
harmonization of travel and trade restrictions became auxiliaries.
5.1. Reformation of the IHR
The IHR gradually fell into irrelevance. The three infectious
diseases discussed at the first international sanitary conference in
1851- cholera, plague and yellow fever -were the only infectious
diseases subject to the then-current 1981 IHR after the WHA
amended the IHR to remove smallpox from the list. 5 5 The removal
of smallpox from the IHR's list of infectious diseases left the IHR
applicable to cholera, plague and yellow fever-the Asiatic
diseases -"quarantinable diseases" and "pestilential diseases of
156
the past."
SARS has already been discussed as playing a role in
reawakening interest in an international law approach to infectious
disease control. However, SARS itself was but an emblem of the
convergence of several trends. 5 7 First, international trade and
travel act as effective channels for microbial traffic. 5 8 Second,
public health capabilities are deteriorating or nonexistent, while
antimicrobial drugs are losing their effectiveness. 5 9 Third, the
internationalization of public health through international health
organizations has largely failed. 160 Fourth, unprecedented levels of
deeply-rooted social, economic, and environmental problems that
provide diseases with fertile conditions have developed all over
154 See id. at 333-38 (elaborating upon the factors which contributed to the
decline of the "classical regime" and to the increasing cooperation between
nations in the arena of international public health law).
155 Id. at 337-38.
156

Id. at 338.

See John D. Blum, Law as Development: Reshaping the Global Legal Structures
of Public Health, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 207, 210 (2004) (arguing that the spread of
SARS and other global infectious diseases is the result of increased development).
158 See id. at 210 ("T]he world has become an increasingly smaller place,
resulting in the transfer of health problems across borders.").
159 See Scott Burris, Law as a Structural Factor in the Spread of Communicable
Disease, 36 Hous. L. REV. 1755, 1761 (1999) (describing the re-emergence of
diseases, such as tuberculosis and the plague, that were previously susceptible to
antimicrobial drugs).
160 See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, InternationalInfectious Disease Law: Revision of
the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations, 291 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 2623 (2004) (arguing that the actions taken by global public health
organizations are "antiquated and structurally weak").
157
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the world. 161 And finally, fifth, the globalization of markets has
weakened the state's ability to control its domestic economy and to
address public health concerns and problems. The logic of global
governance classically arises from such a situation: the presence of
issues that cannot be contained within traditional political
boundaries and the need to manage this uncomfortable
62
interdependence.
5.2. The 2005 IHR
In combination, Articles 19, 21, and 22 of the constitution of the
WHO indicate an awareness of a potentially very different
framework for the conduct of international public health
governance as compared to the soft-law recommendations used by
the WHO in the recent past. This potential framework brings more
meaning to the term "governance" and enforces standardized
global compliance in a realm traditionally bound by the police
1 63
powers of the domestic state. This has only just begun to occur
the reasons behind this are myriad. Perhaps the most obvious
reason, however, is the decline in major global infectious diseases
for much of the early 20th century. 64 As illnesses like smallpox
dropped off the IHR list, national governments saw no adverse
consequences to their interests in pursuing either transparent or
165 It
opaque public health regimes in near-total independence.
would not be until 2003 and the international awareness of SARS
that nation-states began to comprehend the potential chaos of such
a fragmented approach and the long-overdue revision of the IHR
began in earnest. 166
Changes in information technologies at the threshold of the
new century made it possible for the first time for the WHO to be
independent of sovereign reporting whims. 167 Non-governmental
161 See Blum, supra note 157, at 208-13 (outlining the current global conditions
which contribute to the spread of infectious diseases).
162 See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, Why Rich Countries Should Care About the
World's Least Healthy People, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 89, (2007) (arguing that the
world's wealthiest nations should lend assistance to less developed nations in
order to improve conditions in public health).
163 See Fidler, supra note 103.
164 See Burris, supra note 159.
165 See Fidler, supra note 103.
166 Christopher-Paul Milne, Racing the Globalization of Infectious Diseases:
Lessons from the Tortoise and the Hare, 11 NEW ENG. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 1,1 (2004).
167 See Gostin, supra note 162.
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could
experts
and individual
("NGOs")
Organizations
communicate unusual discoveries nearly instantaneously, free of
political restrictions. This idea of a network of global health
16
information would be institutionalized as the GOARN. 8
Almost immediately the deployment of GOARN produced
promising results. In 2003, WHO reported that between January
1998 and March 2002, WHO employed GOARN to identify and
investigate 538 outbreaks of international concern in 132
countries. 169 GOARN-induced investigations from the beginning
involved infectious diseases not subject to the IHR, including
170
meningitis, hemorrhagic fevers, viral encephalitis and anthrax.
The volume of the surveillance information gathered, the speed
with which such information was collected and assessed, and the
disease coverage of the GOARN effort surpassed anything ever
accomplished under the IHR specifically or the earlier regime
generally.'71 In fact, the new IHR specifically grants WHO the
power to use non-governmental sources of information, something
not permitted under the old IHR. 172 This authority changes the
surveillance dynamic between WHO and Member States in ways
that favor global health security over national sovereignty.
5.3. No More Lists: The New IHR Decision Instrument
Bearing in mind the narrowness of the old IHR method of
listing a handful of monitored infectious diseases, it is worthwhile
to consider the deliberate breadth of the new definitions included
in the 2005 IHR. The new definitions demonstrate a calculated
response to the crippling restrictions imposed on the previous IHR
incarnation. Not only are there no specific diseases delimited, the
language in the decision instrument permits one to go beyond the
classic categories of infectious diseases and into the realm of public
168 World Health Organization, Global Outbreak and Response Network
Home Page, http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/ (last visited Feb.
25, 2008).
169 World Health Organization, Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and
Response, WHA54.14, May 21, 2001.
170 World Health Organization, Revision of the International Health Regulations,
Progress Report May 2002, 77 WKLY. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REC. 157, 159 (May 10, 2002)
at 159.
171 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,

SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME

(SARS): STATUS OF OUTBREAK AND LESSONS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE (2003)

available at: http://www.who.int/csr/media/sars.wha.pdf.
172 IHR 2005, supra note 13.
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health events caused by, for example, toxic contamination or even
biological or chemical weapons incidents though there is some
limitation on those responses to prevent the WHO from infringing
on what may be an area of Security Council competence.
"Disease" is broadly defined as: "[A]n illness of medical condition,
irrespective of origin or source, that presents or could present
significant harm to humans." 173 An "event" is: "[A] manifestation
174
of disease or an occurrence that creates a potential for disease."
A "public health risk" is: "[A] likelihood of an event that may
affect adversely the health of human populations, with an
emphasis on one which may spread internationally or may present
a serious and direct danger." 175 A "public health emergency of
international concern" is: "[A]n extraordinary event which is
determined, as provided in these Regulations: (i) to constitute a
public health risk to other States through the international spread
of disease; and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated
176
international response."
The new IHR's requirement that state parties notify WHO of
any event that may constitute a public health emergency of
international concern in its territory is significantly broader than
the old IHR's duty to report cases of only three specific infectious
diseases. 177 That the WHO no longer must wait for a state party
and may act on convincing information from GOARN augments
this fact. Article 10(4) also allows the WHO to share information
about a significant public health risk with other States Parties over
the objection of the State Party in whose territory the event is
occurring. If the State Party instead collaborates fully with the
WHO, that alert may not be necessary; accordingly this mechanism
provides an incentive for states to act early in alerting the WHO.
The broad scope of the notification requirement is consistent with
WHO's desire to build a comprehensive framework for addressing
the international spread of disease. 178 Expanding the notification
obligation around the concept of a "public health emergency of
international concern" required, however, the construction of an
173

Id. art. 1, para. 1.

174

Id.

175

Id.

176

Id.

Id. art. 2.
See Milne, supra note 166 (describing more generally a global pandemic
and presenting possible solutions).
177
178
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approach radically different from one based on identified
infectious diseases. 7 9 This new approach requires more detailed
decision-making mechanisms that guide the States Parties in
determining whether a disease event may constitute a public
180
health emergency of international concern.
The new IHR require States Parties to use a "decision
instrument" to assess whether a disease event might be a public
health emergency of international concern and thus notifiable to
WHO under the new IHR. 181 The decision instrument contains
three pathways for States Parties to determine whether they must
notify a disease event to WHO. 182 First, if the disease event
involves a case of smallpox, poliomyelitis due to wild-type polio
virus, human influenza caused by a new virus subtype, or SARS, it
shall be notified to WHO. 1 83 The new IHR essentially deem any
case of these diseases to be an event that may constitute a public
health emergency of international concern. 84 This pathway is
disease-specific like the notification approach in the old IHR, but
the infectious diseases on the disease-specific list do not include
cholera, plague, or yellow fever. 85 Disease events that fall within
the second and third pathways have to be assessed by states
parties' answering four questions: (1) "is the public health impact
of the event serious?"; (2) "is the event unusual or unexpected?";
(3) "is there a significant risk of international spread?"; and (4) "is
there a significant risk of international travel or trade restrictions?"
If a state party answers "yes" to any two of these questions, the
event is deemed one that may constitute a public health emergency
of international concern and must be reported to WHO under the
new IHR.186

179 See IHR 2005, supra note 13, art. 2 (stating that the purpose and scope of
the regulations is to respond and prevent against "international spread of
disease").
180 See id. annex 2 (presenting a decision tree for the "assessment and
notification of events" that could raise international health concern).

181 Id.
182 See id. (indicating that after an event is detected, there are 3 different
options to take).
183 Id.
184 See Fidler, supra note 103 (presenting a comprehensive analysis of the new
HR).
185 See IHR 2005, supra note 13, annex 2 (using only smallpox, poliomyelitis,
human influenza, and SARS).
186 Id.
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The new IHR also expand the scope of obligations in another
seminal way. The revised regulations require states parties to
develop, strengthen, and maintain core capacities to (1) detect,
assess, notify, and report disease events; and (2) respond promptly
and effectively to public health risks and public health emergencies
of international concern. 187 This requirement is interesting in that,
while Annex 1 lays out benchmarks for core capacities, there is no
room for petition, even in the case of developing countries. Nor is
there any mention of assistance should a Member State require
such in attaining these core capacities. The five-year timeline also
appears to be inflexible. Such a requirement as this, in order to be
effective, would require a very high level of integration as
measured by Stein's model; in Esty's model, this measure would
reach the upper-right quadrant where international officials are
promulgating mandatory regulatory measures to be enforced upon
nation states.
This brings us to a basic contradiction in the realm of global
public health. This contradiction encompasses the IHR but extends
beyond them. The core-capacity requirement is an example of the
growing lack of state control over its own public health situation;
however, the nation-state unit is by no means a vanishing concept.
Illnesses may be ignorant of the trappings of sovereignty, but their
movements do not change the fundamental nature of the
international system, which recognizes states as primary actors. It
is tempting but simplistic to observe the speed and scope of the
transmission of a disease like SARS and conclude that all public
health solutions must be global in character. There is a grain of
truth there, perhaps, but it does not change two fundamental facts:
that all disease is ultimately local when it strikes and human
beings remain divided into nation states. 88 On the other hand,
even in the nineteenth century era of sanitary conventions, states
understood that international surveillance represented a wiser
choice than national quarantine in addressing infectious disease
problems. The nature of disease thus demands that nation states

187 See id. annex 1 (describing detection and response requirements at
different community levels to meet "core capacity requirements under [the]
[r]egulations").
18 See Fidler, supra note 148 (describing the nature of infectious diseases and
the impact on the international system, society, and global society in a world
structured by the modern state system).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

1018

U. Pa. J. In t'l L.

[Vol. 29:4

develop and adhere to rules and institutions that commit all to this
common cause. 189
If we conclude that global rules and global institutions are
inevitable in the realm of public health, then the next issue is the
problem of legitimacy and accountability first discussed above.
Democracy is an easy answer but not a practicable one in this
situation. There are fragmented global publics as opposed to the
genuine public present in democratic sense. "There is no juridical
public on a global level [because] no legal institution [exists to]
define a public with the authority to act globally." 190 "There is also
no sociological public, [however], because only... small [numbers]
of people . . . [actually] identify and communicate with other
people on a global basis."' 91 However, accountability does not
necessarily require some globally representative democracy;
192
accountability can be exercised "through chains of delegation."
6.

REGIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC HEALTH

One possible solution to cut down the distance between the
regulated and the global institutional regulator is to incorporate
more robust public health chapters, addressing standard and norm
193
creation, in to regional trade organizations.
It is axiomatic that harmonizing national systems on a global
level is extremely difficult and problematic, whether the subject is
trade or public health. Deep integration on the regional level is far
easier. 194 Bilateral or regional cooperation on public health matters
has traditionally been rare, 195 particularly in comparison to the
See id. (arguing, for example, that an effective international health
organization is required).
190 Grant & Keohane, supra note 90, at 34.
191Id.
192 See Keohane, supra note 101, at 9.
193 See, e.g., Chang-fa Lo, Laying the Foundationfor Free Trade Agreements to
Include a Health Chapter, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 213, 215 (2007);
William Onzivu, Globalism, Regionalism, or Both: Health Policy and Regional Economic
Integration in Developing Countries, an Evolution of a Legal Regime?, 15 MINN. J. INT'L
L. 111, 146-48 (2006) (discussing potential and actual positive and negative
outcomes resulting from regional health initiatives).
194 See Shara L. Aranoff, Regional Trade Organizations: Strengthening or
Weakening Global Trade?, 88 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 309, 310 (1994) (citing Carlos
Braga contrasting the difficulty of "harmoniz[ing] national systems on a global
basis" with the ease of "deep integration" regionally).
195 See generally Mark David Davis, Multilateraland Regional Efforts to Integrate
Markets: The Uruguary Round, NAFTA, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Initiatives
189
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relative plethora of regional trade cooperation vehicles. However,
even in the context of trade, the mutual reliance of nations in a
given region is acknowledged; some theorists advocate regional
trade organizations in the belief that it promotes regional stability
by providing a set of rules and an institution to avoid the spillover
effects of profound inequality in a region. 19 6 It has been found that
"negotiations among a smaller number of regional participants
tend to produce better outcomes in less time." 197 The knowledge
gained through the smaller-scale trial and error of these
negotiations may serve as a valuable foundation for negotiations at
the multilateral level. And where a nation may be hesitant to
adopt a policy or practice by mandate of a multilateral
organization, that nation may be more willing if it first had the
opportunity to voluntarily test that policy or practice on the
regional level. Likewise, regional trade organizations represent
multiple fora for policy debate and experimentation.
6.1. Legal Framework
Article 14 of the 2005 IHR provides in paragraphs one and two
that the "WHO shall cooperate and coordinate its activities, as
appropriate,
with
other
competent
intergovernmental
organizations or international bodies in the implementation of
these Regulations, including through the conclusion of agreement
and other similar arrangements." 198 In Article 44, the 2005 IHR
encourage States Parties to collaborate and assist each other in the
detection and assessment of, and response to, events. 199 And
finally, in Article 57, entitled "Relationship with Other
International Agreements," paragraph 3 explicitly states that
"[w]ithout prejudice to their obligations under these Regulations,
States Parties that are members of a regional economic integration
organization shall apply in their mutual relations the common
and the European Communities, 87 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 340 (1993) (questioning
whether regional initiatives are really opposed to multilateral initiatives in a trade
context).
196 Alan C. Swan, The Dynamics of Economic Integration in the Western
Hemisphere: The Challenge to America, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2000)
(discussing the potential for regional action to remedy wealth disparities in the
Americas).
197 Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism:
A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT'L L. J. 419, 433 (2001).
198 IHR 2005, supra note 13, art. 14.
199 Id. art. 44.
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Article XX(b) of GATT is the source of GATT/WTO
jurisprudence on public health. 201 Article XX allows the adoption
of any measures to protect human, animal, or plant life so long as
these measures do not constitute either arbitrary discrimination
between countries with substantially similar conditions or a
disguised restriction on international trade. Article XXIV of the
GATT provides for the establishment of regional trade
organizations. 202
6.2. Health and Trade
The economic cost of infectious disease outbreaks are a global
concern. Beyond the obvious costs in mortality and morbidity,
there is a "clear economic cost" of emerging infectious diseases in
wildlife. 20 3 Estimates on the cost of the SARS outbreak range from
$10 billion to $30 billion. 204 This can be compared to the 1994
locally contained outbreak of plague in Surat, India-estimated to
have cost $2 billion-and the 1997 Avian Flu in Hong Kong
estimated to have cost hundreds of millions of dollars in lost
poultry production, commerce, and tourism. 205
For example, in 1994, preventive treatment for 665 people
who had potential contact with a single rabid kitten in a pet
store in New Hampshire cost $1.1 million, and it has been
estimated that the economic burden of Lyme disease
treatment in the United States may be around $500 million
per year. In Australia, a recent epizootic of pilchards
reduced fisheries production by around AU$12 million over
three years. 206

Id. art. 57.
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art XX(b), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
202 Id. art. XXIV.
203 Dazsak, supra note 24, at 447.
204 Id.
205 Id.
200
201

206

Id.
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The economic impacts of zoonotic emerging infectious diseases
may be difficult to predict and may have complex consequences.
For example, the recent proposal to ban blood donation
in the United States by persons who have spent longer than
six months cumulatively in the United Kingdom during
1980-96 and are considered as potential carriers of the
bovine spongioform encephalopathy agent, will reduce the
U.S. blood supply by 2.2%. The cost of introduced disease
to human, livestock, and crop plant health is over $41
billion per year in the United States. Although the value of
biodiversity and significance of disease threats can be
calculated or at least approximated, the cost of global
biodiversity loss due to disease is yet to be assessed. 207
Providing for regional public health standards that correlate
with those promulgated by the WHO is entirely aligned with the
interests of regional trade organizations and represents no
departure from their purpose but rather an expansive view of
enlightened self-interest.
The conflict between cooperative necessity and sovereign
interests has created an accountability and legitimacy deficit in the
growing exercise of transnational regulatory power. Two different
types of responses are possible: first, the attempted extension of
domestic administrative law into intergovernmental regulatory
decisions that affect a nation; and second, the development of new
mechanisms of administrative law at the global level to address
decisions and rules made within the intergovernmental regimes. 208
The incorporation of regional trade organizations represents an
equilibrium point in the tension. Regional organizations allow
their members far greater control over policies or practices adopted
than multilateral organizations. However, they still allow a scale
of coordination, particularly when abetted with the technical
knowledge and resources of global institutions such as the WHO,

Id.
See Kingsbury, supra note 62, at 20-22 (discussing potential mechanisms
for global administration). See also Lawrence 0. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman,
Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law and the Public's Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 12829 (2007) (discussing the need for intergovernmental coordination in efforts to
control flu outbreaks); Fidler, supra note 119, at 248-50 (discussing the effects of
vertical and horizontal allocations of power on international health responses).
207

208
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appropriate for confronting the zoonoses that have been spilling
over and around political boundaries since the first map marked
one territory distinct from the next.
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